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Corporate Criminal Liability for
Homicide: The Need to Punish Both the
Corporate Entity and its Officers
I. Introduction
On June 14, 1985, Cook County Circuit Judge Ronald J.P.
Banks found three executives' of Film Recovery Systems, Inc. guilty
of the murder' of Stefan Golab, a company employee.3 Judge Banks
also found Film Recovery Systems, Inc. and its sister company, Me-
tallic Marketing Systems,4 guilty of involuntary manslaughter5 and
fourteen counts of reckless conduct.' The verdict in People v. Film
Recovery Systems, Inc. marks the first time in the history of the
United States that both a corporation and its individual directors
have been convicted of criminal homicide.8
The guilty verdict in Film Recovery has encouraged local prose-
cutors throughout the country to bring similar charges against corpo-
rations and their directors. 9 Critics of the regulatory agencies argue
I. In addition to the three executives found guilty by Judge Banks, Michael T. MacKay
and Gerald R. Pett were also indicted for murder. As of July 17, 1986, Michael MacKay's
extradition from Utah has been blocked. The action against Gerald R. Pett was dismissed.
Note, Corporations Can Kill Too: After Film Recovery, Are Individuals Accountable For
Corporate Crimes?, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1411, 1427-28 (1986) [hereinafter Corporations Can
Kill Too].
2. For the Illinois statute defining murder, see infra note 178.
3. Report of Proceedings at II, People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc., No. 83-11091
(Cook County Cir. Ct. of Ill. June 14, 1985) consolidated with People v. O'Neil, No. 84-5064
(Cook County Cir. Ct. of Ill. June 14, 1985). For a complete discussion of the case, see infra
notes 167-187 and accompanying text.
4. B.R. MacKay & Sons, Inc., a private silver refinery and part owner of Film Recovery
Systems, Inc., was also indicted for manslaughter. See Corporations Can Kill Too, supra note
I, at 1412.
5. For the Illinois statute defining involuntary manslaughter, see infra note 170.
6. For the Illinois statute defining reckless conduct, see infra note 171.
7. Nos. 83-11091, 84-5064 (Cook County Cir. Ct. of Ill. June 14, 1985).
8. People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc. was not the first indictment of both the corpo-
ration and its individual directors. See, e.g., People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295,
414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981). In Warner-
Lambert the corporation and several of its officers were indicted for the death of six employees
in an explosion in one of the company's manufacturing plants. New York's highest court,
however, dismissed the indictment for failure to prove causation. Id. at 298, 414 N.E.2d at
661, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 160. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Warner-Lambert, see
infra notes 148-66 and accompanying text.
9. Postell, A Criminal Lack of Safety in the Workplace, 22 TRIAL 121 (July 1986). In
Texas, two corporations and their officers have been charged with criminally negligent homi-
cide for the deaths of three employees in trench cave-ins. State v. Peabody Southwest, Inc.,
No. 259, 254 (Travis County Ct. of Tex. filed Nov. 22, 1985); State v. Sabine Consolidated,
Inc., No. 259, 257 (Travis County Ct. of Tex. filed Nov. 22, 1985). In California, Los Angeles
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that current agency policies have failed to deter illicit corporate con-
duct.10 This inadequacy has placed much of the burden on state
prosecutors to bring criminal charges against the corporation. The
Film Recovery decision and the resulting wave of corporate criminal
prosecutions represent a current trend by the courts to increasingly
rely on criminal sanctions to shape corporate conduct." The imposi-
tion of criminal sanctions on corporate criminals raises the question
of whether criminal sanctions constitute an effective deterrent
against corporate misconduct.
Historically, indictment of a corporation for any criminal viola-
tion was impossible.12 As society recognized a strong need'3 to hold
corporations responsible for their criminal actions, the barriers " that
initially barred prosecution of the corporate criminal gave way to the
demands of society. The doctrine of corporate criminal liability de-
veloped in response to the needs of society. As this development
progressed, legal critics continued to question the efficacy of criminal
sanctions against corporate defendants, emphasizing the failure of
criminal sanctions to deter future criminal conduct.1
5
This Comment explores the evolution of the doctrine of corpo-
District Attorney Ira K. Reiner had instituted a "roll out" program in which an attorney and
an investigator are sent to the scene of industrial-workplace deaths. Middleton, Prosecutors
Get Tough on Safety, NAT'L L. Apr. 21, 1986, at I, col. 1. In People v. Maggio, No.
A780779 (Los Angeles Mun. Ct. filed Mar. 26, 1986), District Attorney Reiner brought
charges of involuntary felony-manslaughter against a corporation and its president when an
employee drilling a 33-foot deep elevator shaft suffocated because of inadequate safety equip-
ment. In State v. Autumn Hills Convalescent Nursing Home, No. 85-CR-2526 (Bexar Cty.
Ct. of Tex. filed Apr. 2, 1986), the business entity, a nursing home, the corporation's president,
vice-president, and five current and former employees, were charged with the murder by neg-
lect of an elderly patient. The case was dismissed because of a hung jury. In People v. Landis,
No. 391583 (Los Angeles Mun. Ct. of Cal. filed Dec. 20, 1983), a film director and several
members of the production crew were charged with manslaughter in consequence of the deaths
of three actors on a movie set. See also Corporations Can Kill Too, supra note I, at 1411-12.
10. See Radin, Corporate Criminal Liability for Employee-Endangering Activities, 18
COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROBs. 39 (1983). From its inception in April, 1971 through 1983, only
seven criminal cases have been prosecuted under the Occupational Safety and Health Act.
None of the seven cases has "extracted penalties greater than those attainable under the Act's
civil provisions." Id. at 67. The futility of the Act's criminal sanctions demonstrates the need
for a more effective prosecution of corporate criminal behavior. Id. at 63-67.
11. See, e.g., Comment, Developments in the Law - Corporate Crime: Regulating Cor-
porate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1229 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter Developments] ("[T]he federal government has come to rely more and more on the deter-
rent effect of criminal punishment to shape corporate action."). For a criticism of the
Developments analysis, see Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 445-46 (1981).
12. See infra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
13. See I K. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 1:01 at 1 (1984).
14. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 213-30 and accompanying text.
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rate criminal responsibility for homicides from its inception to its
current status represented by the Film Recovery decision. It probes
the appropriateness and efficacy of using criminal sanctions to deter
illicit corporate conduct. Finally, this Comment concludes that crim-
inal sanctions can be an effective method of deterring illicit corpo-
rate behavior only when the corporation and its individual officers
are prosecuted with equal fervor.
II. Corporate Criminal Responsibility
A. Early History
The evolution of the theory of corporate criminal responsibility
has been a very slow, methodical process. Traditionally, corporations
were not indictable for any wrongful act.1 In 1701, Chief Justice
Holt stated in an anonymous case1 7 that "[a] corporation is not in-
dictable but the particular members of it are."1 8 A corporation was
considered to be a fictional entity.1 9 Based on the principle that a
corporation had no soul and no body, courts held that a corporation
was incapable of having the criminal intent necessary for all
crimes. 2o
As the growth and development of the modern corporate entity
progressed, courts began to move away from the inflexible approach
adopted by the early common law judges."1 In spite of the legal bar-
16. K. BRICKEY, supra note 13, § 2:01, at 13.
17. Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 1518 (K.B. 1701). It is questioned by some authorities
whether this case was referred to by Lord Holt when he extorted the bitter complaint of his
reporters, "that the stuff which they published would make posterity think ill of his under-
standing, and that of his brethren on the bench." State v. Morris and Essex Railroad Co., 23
N.J.L. 360 (1852).
18. Chief Justice Holt's famous dictum became accepted as black letter law by treatise
writers. See, e.g., I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 476 ("A corporation cannot commit
treason, or felony, or other crime, in its corporate capacity: though its members may in their
distinct individual capacities.").
19. "A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in the
contemplation of law." Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518,
636 (1819). See also K. BRICKEY, supra note 13, § 2:01, at 14. (The corporation was recog-
nized in law as an artificial entity. As an abstraction it lacked physical, mental, and moral
capacity to engage in wrongful conduct or to suffer punishment.)
20. I W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.10, at 361 (1986); see
also Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability For Homicide: Has The Fiction Been Extended
Too Far?, 4 J.L. & COM. 95, 96 (1984) [hereinafter Corporate Criminal Liability] (a corpora-
tion has no soul or mind; therefore it lacks the requisite intent necessary to be guilty of of-
fenses requiring a guilty mind). A corporation can, however, be executed. Blackstone called
the court-ordered dissolution of a corporation "civil death." See W. BLACKSTONE, supra note
18, at 484.
21. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 20, § 3.10 at 361. See also K. BRICKEY, supra
note 13, § 2:02, at 15. (During their early development corporations were few in number, well
regulated, and chartered to perform specific tasks. Their impact on the general populace was
minimal. As the corporation became more common, a growing perception of the courts and
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riers22 to corporate prosecution, there was a strong public perception
of the necessity of holding corporations accountable for their ac-
tions.2 3 The theory of corporate criminal liability developed under
three common-law frameworks - the law of nuisance,24 the nonfea-
sance/misfeasance distinction, 5 and crimes requiring intent.2
The evolution of corporate criminal liability began when corpo-
rations were held strictly liable for violations of welfare offenses. 7
An individual could bring a cause of action in nuisance against a
corporation if the corporation's action or failure to act caused harm
to the public good. 23 Holding corporations responsible for violations
of welfare offenses was not precluded by any theoretical or philo-
sophical barrier because there was no intent requirement and the
penalty, a fine, could be imposed on the corporation. 9
The nonfeasance/misfeasance distinction was well established in
English common law."0 As early as 18341 American courts had
adopted the principle that corporations may be held criminally liable
for nonfeasance, 2 but not misfeasance."a This distinction, however,
legislatures recognized the need for additional mechanisms to regulate corporate behavior.)
22. In addition to the theoretical barrier of the corporate fiction, "because the commis-
sion of a crime was ultra vires activity to a corporation, a criminal act by a corporate agent
was considered beyond the authority of a corporation and therefore could not be imputed to
it." Corporations Can Kill Too, supra note I, at 1416-17 (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., Music
Box, Inc. v. Mills, 10 La. App. 665, 667, 121 So. 196, 197 (1929) (illegal acts committed by
corporate officers "can have no legal, binding effect upon the corporations themselves"); Com-
monwealth v. Punksutawney St. Passenger Ry. Co., 24 Pa. C. 25, 26 (1899) (manslaughter "is
so far ultra vires as to contravene all accepted rules in the criminal law for making it the act of
the principal").
23. Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 20, at 96.
24. For a discussion of the development of the law of nuisance in the corporate context,
see generally K. BRICKEY, supra note 13, § 2:07, at 26.
25. See infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
27. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 20, § 3.10, at 361. Corporations were charged
with violations of welfare offenses for maintaining "[plolluted river basins, deteriorated roads,
decaying bridges and malodorous slaughterhouses." K. BRICKEY, supra note 13, § 2:07, at 26.
28. People v. Corporation of Albany, 11 Wend. 539, 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834). Com-
mon law nuisance was defined as "an offense against the public, either by doing a thing which
tends to the annoyance of all the King's subjects, or by neglecting to do a thing which the
common good requires." Id.
29. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 20, § 3.10, at 361.
30. K. BRICKEY, supra note 13, § 2:08, at 27.
31. People v. Corporation of Albany, II Wend. 539 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834).
32. "Nonfeasance" is defined as "the omission of an act which a person ought to do."
Bell v. Josselyn, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 309, 311, 63 Am. Dec. 741 (1855). See, e.g., New York &
G.L.R. Co. v. State, 50 N.J.L. 303, 13 A. I (1888) (corporation indicted for failure to keep a
bridge in repair); People v. Clark, 8 N.Y. 169, 14 N.Y.S. 642 (1891) (Railroad corporation
failed to heat its passenger cars in conformance with state statute).
33. "Misfeasance" is defined as "the improper doing of an act which a person might
lawfully do." Bell v. Josselyn, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 309, 311, 63 Am. Dec. 741 (1855). See, e.g.,
State v. Great Works Milling & Manufacturing Co., 20 Me. 41, 43 (1841) (a corporation
"can neither commit a crime nor misdemeanor, by any positive or affirmative act, or incite
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was soon abandoned. In State v. Morris and Essex Railroad," the
New Jersey Supreme Court became the first court to abandon the
nonfeasance/misfeasance distinction. Two years later the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court, in the case of Commonwealth v. Proprietors of
New Bedford Bridge,8 5 using similar reasoning as that used in Mor-
ris and Essex Railroad, affirmed the propriety of holding a corpora-
tion criminally liable for an affirmative act.
3 6
B. Crimes Requiring the Formulation of Intent
In contrast to the rather rapid development and acceptance of a
theory of corporate criminal liability for welfare offenses and nonfea-
sance/misfeasance, the extension of the theory to crimes requiring
intent developed slowly. 7 In their landmark decisions, the Supreme
Courts of New Jersey and Massachusetts held a corporation crimi-
nally liable for an affirmative act, yet neither court extended liability
to offenses requiring an evil intention.88 The courts perceived the ex-
istence of two barriers that precluded the extension of liability to
crimes requiring intent."' The first barrier, based on the notion that
a corporation was a fictional entity, held corporations incapable of
forming the mens rea'0 necessary for a finding of guilt in those
others to do so...").
34. 23 N.J.L. 360 (1852). The company was indicted on a nuisance charge for building
a bridge on a public highway and for obstructing the road with railroad cars. Sustaining the
indictment, the court stated that there is no valid reason why a corporation may "be held
liable for nonfeasance, and not for misfeasance." Id. at 369 (emphasis in original). It stated
that a corporation cannot be held liable for certain crimes because a corporation is incapable
of a "corrupt intent" or because the "punishment imposed by law cannot be inflicted upon a
corporation." Id. at 370. The court concluded, however, that the "creation of a mere nuisance
involves no such element. It is totally immaterial whether the person erecting the nuisance
does it ignorantly or by design, with a good intent or an evil intent; and there is no reason Why
for such an offense a corporation should not be indicted." Id.
35. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 339 (1854). The corporation was indicted on a nuisance charge
for building a bridge across a river in such a way that navigation was obstructed.
36. The Massachusetts Supreme Court stated that:
Corporations cannot be indicted for offenses which derive their criminality
from evil intention, or which consist in a violation of those social.duties which
appertain to men and subjects. They cannot be guilty of treason or felony; of
perjury or offenses against the person. But beyond this, there is no reason for
their exemption from the consequences of unlawful and wrongful acts committed
by their agents in pursuance of authority derived from them . . . It may be
added, that the distinction between a non-feasance and a misfeasance is often
one more of form than of substance.
Id. at 345-46.
37. See K. BRICKEY, supra note 13, § 2:09, at 31.
38. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
39. See Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability For Homicide: Can The Criminal Law
Control Corporate Behavior?, 38 Sw. L.J. 1275, 1277 (1985) [hereinafter Corporate
Behavior].
40. In United States v. Greenbaum, 138 F.2d 437, 438 (C.C.A.N.J. 1943), the court
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crimes characterized as malus animus.4 1 The second barrier was of
statutory creation. Most criminal statutes for crimes requiring a spe-
cific intent mandated corporal punishment. 2 Since the corporation
lacked any physical existence it could not be incarcerated. Many
statutes also required the crime to be committed by a "person,"
thereby precluding prosecution of corporations."'
Beginning at the turn of the century, the development of corpo-
rate criminal responsibility witnessed the gradual erosion of these
barriers culminating in the Film Recovery case. The first barrier to
fall was the punishment barrier. In United States v. Van Schaik,"
the circuit court for the southern district in New York allowed in-
dictment of a corporation after nearly 900 passengers drowned when
a steamship owned by the corporation caught fire."5 The New York
manslaughter statute provided that violators of its provisions should
be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of years and hard labor."'
Despite the absence of direct statutory language proscribing a means
of punishment of corporations, the court reasoned that Congress
must have inadvertently omitted a suitable punishment and sus-
tained the indictment.47 For the first time a statute's failure to pro-
vide an appropriate penalty was rejected as a bar to corporate crimi-
nal liability.
48
defines "mens rea" as a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; or a criminal intent. The
Model Penal Code delineates four states of mens rea: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and
negligently. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
41. See Corporate Behavior, supra note 39, at 1277 n.14. "Malus animus" is defined as
a bad or evil intention.
42. See K. BRICKEY, supra note 13, § 2:09, at 31 n.87. The author states that "one
troublesome obstacle to imposing corporate liability for felonies was the nature of the author-
ized punishment. The early felonies - murder, wounding, mayhem, false imprisonment, rape,
robbery, burglary, arson and larceny - all were punishable by death or dismemberment, sanc-
tions quite incapable of being applied to the corporate entity."
43. See Corporate Behavior, supra note 39, at 1277.
44. 134 F. 592 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904).
45. Id. at 594.
46. The statute provided that "every owner ... through whose fraud, connivance, mis-
conduct or violation of law, the life of any person is destroyed, shall be deemed guilty of
manslaughter, and upon conviction thereof . . . shall be sentenced to confinement at hard
labor. ... Id.
47. Id. at 602. The court inquired:
Is it to be concluded, simply because the given punishment cannot be en-
forced, that Congress intended to allow corporate carriers by sea to kill their
passengers through misconduct that would be a punishable offense if done by a
natural person? A corporation can be guilty of causing death by its wrongful
act. It can with equal propriety be punished in a civil or criminal action. It
seems a more reasonable alternative that Congress inadvertently omitted to pro-
vide a suitable punishment for the offense, when committed by a corporation,
than that it intended to give the owner impunity simply because it happened to
be a corporation.
48. See I. U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW,
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Five years after Van Schaik, the United States Supreme Court
further eroded the punishment barrier in United States v. Union
Supply Co.4' The corporation in Union Supply was a wholesale
dealer in oleomargarine. It had been charged with violation of a fed-
eral statute requiring such dealers to maintain records of their busi-
ness transactions."0 The statute provided that anyone who violated
the provisions of the statute would be fined and imprisoned."1 The
defendant corporation argued that in the event of a conviction, the
statute precluded punishment of a corporation because the corpora-
tion could not be imprisoned. 2 The Court rejected this argument
concluding that "[t]he natural inference, when a statute prescribes
two independent penalties, is that it means to inflict them so far as it
can, and that if one of them is impossible, it does not mean on that
account to let the defendant escape."5 The Court's decision, there-
fore, made it possible to prosecute, convict and punish a corporation
through the imposition of a fine.
Breaking the mens rea barrier presented a greater theoretical
challenge than the punishment barrier. A corporation has no mind
and no soul; therefore, a mental state has no meaning when applied
to a corporation.84 Several theories that attempt to justify the impo-
sition of criminal penalties on corporations have been suggested by
legal commentators. 8 The first theory holds a corporation responsi-
ble for the conduct of its agents.5" The second theory holds a corpo-
ration responsible only for the acts of its policy-making officials. 7
The final theory holds a corporation liable for illegal conduct that
results from reckless or unreasonable conduct. 58 Although no single
WORKING PAPERS 168 (1970) [hereinafter WORKING PAPERS]. The commission stated that:
It seems quite clear that the Supreme Court does not regard a specific dec-
laration in a statute that corporations are subject to its terms as necessary in
order to impose criminal penalties of the statute upon such bodies. Rather, it has
long ago held that if the section of a statute prescribing a duty to be performed
(or proscribing certain conduct) embraces all actors, and the actor intended to
be reached is as likely to be a corporation as a natural person, the words "any
person" in the penal clause of the statute are equally broad, imposing liability
for violation upon all who are bound by the duty for proscription.
49. 215 U.S. 50 (1909).
50. See Act of May 9, 1902, ch. 784, Pub. L. No. 57-110, 32 Stat. 193, 197.
51. Id. § 6, 32 Stat. at 197.
52. 215 U.S. at 52-53.
53. Id. at 55.
54. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
55. See Developments, supra note II, at 1241; WORKING PAPERS, supra note 48, at
184-85; Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PiTr L. REv. 21, 42 (1957); Edgerton,
Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827, 840-44 (1927).
56. See infra notes 61-86 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
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theory has gained universal acceptance, 59 each theory recognizes the
strong necessity of holding corporations liable for specific intent
crimes.60
The first theory of corporate blameworthiness, adopted from the
law of agency, 61 is commonly referred to as the doctrine of respon-
deat superior.62 The theory treats a corporation as a principal and its
officers, directors and employees as agents of the principal."8 The
corporation, as principal, is responsible for the acts and intent of
each of its agents. Through the doctrine of respondeat superior, the
mental state of any employee is imputed to the corporation." Under
this theory the corporation may be held liable for the wrongful act of
a single low-level employee, even though its directors or managers
are blameless.65
Several commentators have argued that this theory is unjust be-
cause it punishes a corporation when it is not morally proper to do
SO." Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, however, a corpora-
tion may not be held criminally liable for the acts of any of its
agents unless the agent commits a crime within the scope of his em-
ployment with the intent to benefit the corporation.' At first glance
it seems that this standard would be sufficient to preclude corporate
liability when it is not morally proper to do so. In practice, however,
this standard is easily satisfied.
First, it must be proven that an agent of the corporation com-
mitted a crime and that the agent acted with the requisite intent68
59. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 55, at 23 ("It is safe to say that, for the most part, the
law has proceeded without rationale whatsoever...").
60. See id. See also K. BRICKEY, supra note 13, § 3:01, at 39 ("public policy considera-
tions required that a corporation be held accountable for crimes committed or authorized by
officers and directors").
61. See Developments, supra note 11, at 1247; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 70, at 460-67 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
62. Translated from latin, "respondeat superior" literally means "Let the master an-
swer." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1179 (5th ed. 1979).
63. See Developments, supra note II, at 1242.
64. Id.
65. See Mueller, supra note 55, at 42 (corporation liable for wrongful act of an inferior
employee even though top management employees are blameless).
66. See, e.g., id. (The author argues that this theory of corporate blameworthiness can
lead to unjust results when both the shareholders and top-level managers are blameless); De-
velopments, supra note 1I, at 1242 ("it is unfair to impute to the corporation the intent of a
lone agent without also considering whether conscientious efforts were made by other agents to
prevent the crime.").
67. See Developments, supra note II, at 1247.
68. Id. It would be logical to assume that the specific intent required to convict a corpo-
ration would be the same as is necessary to convict an individual. "However, since the corpora-
tion is perceived as an aggregation of its agents, it is not necessary to prove that a specific
person acted illegally, only that some agent of the corporation committed the crime." Id. at
1248 (emphasis in original). See, United States v. American Stevedores, Inc., 310 F.2d 47, 48
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required by the governing statute.6 9 While it is conceded that a cor-
poration acts only through its agents, prosecution of the corporation
does not depend on indictment of the agents.70 The acquittal of a
corporation's agents will not preclude conviction of the corporation
on the same charges .7 The general premise that corporate intent is
imputed only from individual intent is frequently contradicted by the
federal courts.7 2 These courts have consistently found the require-
ment of corporate criminal intent satisfied even where no agent's
criminal intent has been shown.73
Second, for the intent of an agent to be imputed to the corpora-
tion, it must be shown that the agent committed the crime while
acting within his scope of employment.7 ' The meaning of the phrase
"scope of employment" has never been clearly defined. 5 Generally,
however, an agent's act "is within the scope of his employment if it
is of the kind which he is employed to perform, occurs substantially
within the authorized limits of time and space, and is actuated, at
(2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 969 (1963); United States v. General Motors Corp., 121
F.2d 376, 411 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941). See also Mueller, supra note 55,
and accompanying text.
69. See Developments, supra note 11, at 1247. See Boise Dodge, Inc. v. United States,
406 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1979).
70. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 411 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
71. See Note, Individual Liability of Agents for Corporate Crimes Under the Proposed
Federal Criminal Code, 31 VAND. L. REv. 965, 968 (1978) ("juries have frequently found
corporate defendants criminally culpable while acquitting agents who clearly committed the
criminal acts"). See, e.g., United States v. American Stevedores, Inc., 310 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir.
1962) (acquittal of corporation's principal operators of willfully failing to report corporate
income did not preclude conviction of corporation on same charges), cert. denied 371 U.S. 969
(1963).
72. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 411 (7th Cir.)
(court acquitted all individual defendants but convicted corporation of conspiracy to restrain
interstate trade and commerce in violation of § I of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act), cert. de-
nied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941). See also United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 (1943)
(individual convicted of violation of Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act but corporation
acquitted). But see Imperial Meat Co. v. United States, 316 F.2d 435, 440 (10th Cir.) (court
adhered to the requirement of finding an individual guilty as a condition precedent to convic-
tion of a corporation), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 820 (1963); Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States,
178 F.2d 363, 370-71 (8th Cir. 1949) (conviction of corporation and acquittal of its agents
"weakened the presumption of correctness usually attributable to the verdict of a jury"), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 942 (1950).
73. See Developments, supra note II, at 1249.
74. See W. PROSSER, supra note 61, § 70, at 460-67. For a general discussion of "scope
of employment," see Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem, 38 MICH.
L. REV. 1222 (1940).
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 (1958). The conduct of an agent
"must be of the same general nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct author-
ized." The Restatement also lists several factors to be taken into account when determining
whether or not "conduct, although not authorized, is nevertheless so similar to or incidental to
the conduct authorized as to be within the scope of employment ... ." Id.
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least in part, by a purpose to serve the master. ''7 6
The courts, however, have adopted a very flexible approach
when defining "scope of employment."' 7" The acts of an agent are
often held to fall within the scope of employment even when the
agent acted in violation of express instructions and general corporate
policy.78 The flexibility employed by the courts in interpreting an
agent's "scope of employment" allows the viability of the doctrine to
be maintained. Without such an extension of liability, corporations
could avoid liability altogether by the simple expediency of labelling
all illegal conduct ultra vires,79 thereby placing such conduct outside
the scope of employment.80
Third, to establish corporate liability under the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior, the prosecution must show that the illegal act
was committed with the intent to benefit the corporation.81 This re-
quirement has not been strictly enforced by the courts. Many courts
have sustained conviction of the corporation even though no actual
benefit has been derived from the agent's illegal act.82 The require-
ment, however, has not been completely discarded, and it remains an
important evidentiary tool.83
76. See W. PROSSER, supra note 61, § 70, at 461.
77. Id. at 460. See also United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 204 (3rd Cir. 1970) (when viewed in light of judge's definition of "scope
of employment," agent's conduct was clearly within scope of his employment), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 948 (1971).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1006-07 (9th Cir.
1972) (corporation criminally liable under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act for act of agent even
though agent acted contrary to company policy and was twice told to discontinue such prac-
tices); United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 204
(3rd Cir. 1970) (defendant corporations and corporate officers convicted of violations of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); United States v. Armour & Co.,
168 F.2d 342, 343-44 (3d Cir. 1948) (corporation convicted of violating regulations issued
pursuant to the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 in consequence of acts by several of its
agents).
79. "Ultra vires" is defined as acts beyond the scope of the powers of a corporation, as
defined by its charter or laws of the state of incorporation. State ex rel. v. Holston Trust Co.,
168 Tenn. 546, -, 79 S.W.2d 1012, 1016 (1935).
80. See Developments. supra note 11, at 1250.
81. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495, 498-500 (5th Cir.
1966) (employer may not be penalized for employee's criminal act if agent acted for some
purpose other than that of serving employer); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d
120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962) ("[T]he purpose to benefit the corporation is decisive in terms of
equating the agent's action with that of the corporation."). See generally K. BRICKEY, supra
note 13, § 4:02, at 84.
82. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128-29 (5th Cir. 1962). See, e.g.,
United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934, 942 (6th Cir. 1963) (proof of actual benefit to the
corporation was not essential to a finding of its criminal responsibility); United States v. Em-
pire Packing Co., 174 F.2d 16, 20 (7th Cir.) (proof of actual benefit not necessary) cert.
denied, 337 U.S. 959 (1949).
83. E.g., Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir.) ("We do not
accept benefit as a touchstone of corporate criminal liability; benefit, at best, is an evidential,
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In addition to the flexible approaches used by courts to satisfy
the requirements of scope of employment and intent to benefit the
corporation, under the doctrine of ratification these factors may be
satisfied if an employer approves of the agent's conduct after it has
occurred.84 When a corporation adopts and ratifies the acts of its
agents, the corporation will be responsible for such acts, even if the
agent is performing outside the scope of his employment and without
intent to benefit the corporation.88 Under the doctrine of ratification
a corporation will be held liable for the approbation of its agents'
wrongful acts rather than the commission of wrongful acts by the
corporation itself.8
The second theory of corporate blameworthiness, whereby only
the intentions of top level personnel are imputed to the corporation,
developed in response to criticisms of the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior.87 Under this "qualified approach" to the doctrine of respon-
deat superior, the corporation is held to be morally responsible only
for the acts and intent of its policy-making officials.88 Unlike the
doctrine of respondeat superior, the "qualified approach" does not
allow a corporation to be held responsible for the acts and intent of a
lower level employee over which the corporation has no control. 89 It
is this factor of corporate control over the actions of its top level
employees that distinguishes the "qualified approach" from the doc-
trine of respondeat superior.90
not an operative fact."), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
84. The doctrine of ratification has been defined as "the affirmance by a person of a
prior act which did not bind him but which was done or professedly done on his account,
whereby the act, as to some or all persons, is given effect as if originally authorized by him."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 82 (1958); Developments, supra note I1, at 1250-51.
85. See, e.g., Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 149 (6th Cir.
1960) (corporation responsible for acts of agents when superiors adopted and ratified such
conduct).
86. Developments, supra note I1, at 1251 n.38. The author notes that "[t]his notion
conflicts with the traditional criminal law principle that one is generally not criminally liable
for an act merely because he approved of it after the fact."
87. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
88. See Developments, supra note II, at 1242; WORKING PAPERS, supra note 48, at 185
n.67. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 55, at 42 (the author refers to this qualified approach as
"vicarious liability proper" and the doctrine of respondeat superior as "vicarious liability twice
removed."). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (1962). The Model Penal Code has pro-
posed a theory similar to the "qualified approach." Only the intent of top officials and not that
of subordinates is imputed to the corporation. For a discussion of the Model Penal Code provi-
sions, see generally Developments, supra note II, at 1251-57.
89. Theoretically, a corporation has the power to appoint and the power to supervise
only its top level officials. Developments, supra note 1I, at 1242. The author notes that ideally
a corporation is controlled by a group of stockholders. The stockholders, through their elected
board of directors, control and supervise the management. Id.
90. The "qualified approach" has also been heavily criticized. The theory rests on the
premise that the shareholders of a corporation have the power to supervise and control top-
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The third theory of corporate blameworthiness is based on a
negligence standard. The "negligence theory" imposes the requisite
intent on the corporation itself as a working, operating unit.91 It rec-
ognizes that in the typical corporation, illegal conduct "is the conse-
quence of corporate processes such as standard operating procedures
and hierarchical decisionmaking" rather than "the isolated activity
of a single agent."92 When corporate conduct is so unreasonable as
to totally disregard accepted safety procedures, the corporation will
be held morally responsible for its conduct. 9
Of the three theories of corporate moral blameworthiness, 94 the
doctrine of respondeat superior has been the theory most widely ac-
cepted and applied by the courts. In New York Central & Hudson
River Railroad v. United States,9" the Supreme Court firmly estab-
lished the application of this doctrine as the proper standard to be
used in the prosecution of corporate criminal activity." The Court
recognized the strong public interest in preventing corporations from
committing "certain practices forbidden in the interest of public pol-
icy."' 7 The Court noted that it needed to carry the tort doctrine
"only a step farther" to uphold the conviction of a corporation by
imputing the act and intent of its agent to the corporation.98 A more
restrictive interpretation of the doctrine of respondeat superior
would grant corporations immunity from criminal liability and "vir-
level officials. Ideally, it may be true that shareholders have such power and control. In reality,
however, the shareholder of a typical corporation has very little control over corporate officers.
Developments, supra note 11, at 1242. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 48, at 189 n.76
(shareholders lack practical control of a corporation because they are rarely in a position to
know of conduct of officers).
91. Developments. supra note 11, at 1243.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1243 n.59.
94. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
95. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
96. Id. at 492-96. New York Central was charged and convicted of violating the Elkins
Act, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 (1907) (current version 49 U.S.C. §§ 41-43 (1982)). The purpose
of the Elkins Act was to make the act of the agent the act of the corporation, and to include
both within its restrictions. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Elkins Act, recogniz-
ing that legal theorists of the day already adopted a form of vicarious liability. "Since a corpo-
ration acts by its officers and agents, their purposes, motives, and intent are just as much those
of the corporation as are the things done." Id. at 492-93 (quoting Bishop, New Criminal Law
§ 417). The Court stated that "we see no good reason why corporations may not be held
responsible for and charged with the knowledge and purposes of their agents, acting with the
authority conferred upon them . . . .If it were not so, many offenses might go unpunished."
Id. at 494-95. For a discussion of the doctrine of respondeat superior in the corporate context,
see generally WORKING PAPERS, supra note 48, at 168-73.
97. 212 U.S. at 495. As early as 1909, the Court recognized the immense power of the
corporate system. The law "cannot shut its eyes to the fact that the great majority of business
transactions in modern times are conducted through these bodies, and particularly that inter-
state commerce is almost entirely in their hands." Id.
98. Id. at 494.
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tually take away the only means of effectually controlling the subject
matter and correcting the abuses aimed at." 9
With the Supreme Court's adoption of the respondeat superior
doctrine to determine the extent of a corporation's criminal liability,
the mens rea barrier no longer shielded corporations from criminal
responsibility. The statutory barrier, however, had yet to be bro-
ken. °00 Most criminal statutes proscribed the commission or omission
of an act by a "human being," but did not include business entities
within the definition.10' The prosecutorial effect of such statutory
language was demonstrated in the case of People v. Rochester Rail-
way & Light Co."0 2
In Rochester Railway & Light, the corporation was indicted for
manslaughter because it had allegedly installed "certain apparatus"
in such a grossly negligent manner "that gases escaped and caused
the death of an inmate."' 03 The court first addressed the question of
whether a corporation may properly be indicted for manslaughter.'"
Adopting the reasoning from New York Central, the court held that
the corporation was responsible for the acts of its agents and, there-
fore, in the proper case a corporation may be indicted for
manslaughter. 05
The court then addressed the issue of whether the homicide
statute, which defined homicide as "the killing of one human being
by the act, procurement or omission of another"' 0 6 included corpora-
tions within its purview. The court concluded that the use of the
word "another" in this statutory context clearly indicated a legisla-
tive intent to limit liability for commission of the offense to human
99. Id. New York Central involved the violation of a regulatory offense that did not
require willfulness or knowledge as an element. The Supreme Court later applied the concept
of corporate willfulness to criminal law in United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121
(1958). In A & P Trucking, a partnership was prosecuted as an entity under § 222(a) of the
Motor Carrier Act for "knowingly and willingly" violating requirements of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Although the defendant was a partnership, the Court's reasoning en-
compassed all "impersonal entities" including "corporations and other associations." The
Court stated that "it is elementary that such impersonal entities can be guilty of 'knowing' or
'willful' violations of regulatory statutes through the doctrine of respondeat superior." Id. at
125.
100. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
102. 195 N.Y. 102, 88 N.E. 22 (1909). See also Commonwealth v. Illinois Central Rail-
road Co., 152 Ky. 320, 153 S.W. 459 (1913) (homicide requires killing of one human being by
"another" human being).
103. 195 N.Y. at 104, 88 N.E. at 22.
104. Id. at 104-107, 88 N.E. at 22-24.
105. Id. at 107, 88 N.E. at 24. The court stated that "we have no doubt that a definition
of certain forms of manslaughter might have been formulated which would be applicable to a
corporation." Id.
106. N.Y. PENAL CODE § 179, as quoted in 195 N.Y. at 107, 88 N.E. at 24.
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beings. 107 In dismissing the indictment, the court specifically rejected
the argument that "another" refers to another "person," which
might then include corporations. °8
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in State v. Lehigh Valley
Railroad Co.,'09 was confronted with a similar question of seman-
tics. 10 The court examined the Rochester Railway decision and rec-
ognized that under the statutory language of the New York Penal
code, the New York court correctly held that "another" meant "an-
other human being.""' The court noted, however, that there was a
trend in corporate criminal law to move away from such inflexible
approaches." 2 The Lehigh Valley court consequently rejected the
formalistic approach to statutory interpretation employed by the
court in Rochester Railway and sustained the indictment against the
corporation" s concluding that the word "person" included "bodies
corporate" as well as individuals.
1 4
C. Recent Decisions
For nearly 60 years, New Jersey remained the only state to sus-
tain an indictment against a corporation for criminal homicide. The
semantic barrier created by the statutory definitions of "person" re-
mained an obstacle to corporate criminal responsibility. It was not
until 1974 that the reasoning of Lehigh Valley was adopted in New
York to sustain an indictment against a corporation for negligent
homicide.
In People v. Ebasco Services, Inc.,"' several corporations were
107. 195 N.Y. at 107, 88 N.E. at 24. The court noted: "It seems to us that it would be a
violent strain upon a criminal statute to construe this word as meaning an agency of some kind
other than that already mentioned or referred to, and as bridging over a radical transition
from human beings to corporations." Id.
108. Id.
109. 90 N.J.L. 372, 103 A. 685 (1917).
110. Id. at 373-4, 103 A. at 686. A grand jury indicted the Lehigh Valley Railroad and
others for criminal manslaughter after some railroad cars overloaded with dynamite exploded
and killed a bystander. Id.
Il1. Id.
I 12. Id. Although the court recognized that the Rochester Railway decision was a valid
interpretation of the New York Penal Code, the court criticized the case stating:
The case is a good illustration of the way in which the proper growth and
development of the law can be prevented by the hard and fast language of a
statute, and of the advantage of our own system by which the way is open for a
court to do justice by the proper application of legal principles.
Id.
113. Id. The Lehigh Valley Railroad case was the first decision to uphold the indict-
ment of a corporation for criminal homicide. See Corporate Behavior, supra note 39, at 1280
n.48.
114. Id.
115. 77 Misc.2d 784, 354 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
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indicted for negligent homicide when a cofferdam still under con-
struction collapsed, causing the death of two workmen. The corpora-
tions weie indicted for violation of the New York Penal Code,11
which ha I been revised since the Rochester Railway decision. The
new statcte stated that "A person is guilty of criminally negligent
homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of an-
other person." 1 1 The court stated that the definition of "person" as
defined in the code "does not require that the person committing the
act of homicide be a human being."" 8 The court also noted that
when used in other provisions of the Penal Code, "person" included
"a public or private corporation.""' 9 Although the court found the
indictment defective and dismissed the case, it concluded that a cor-
poration may commit homicide and may properly be held
accountable. 2 °
The Ebasco Services case was the first of a recent wave of deci-
sions holding corporations criminally liable for homicide based upon
definitions of the word "person" that include a corporation within
the meaning of a common-law or statutory definition of homicide.' 2 '
In State v. Ford Motor Co., 2 the Ford Motor Company was
charged with three counts of reckless homicide after three teenage
girls died when the Pinto they were driving was struck from behind
and exploded.' 23 The court had no trouble sustaining the indictment
because the Indiana Criminal Code 2 " specifically included corpora-
tions within its definition of "person. '"125
116. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.00-.60 (McKinney 1975).
117. Id.
118. 77 Misc.2d at 786, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 810. The Penal Code defined "person" as
follows: "'Person' when referring to the victim of a homicide, means a human being who has
been born and is alive." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05[1] (emphasis added by court).
119. 77 Misc.2d at 787, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 811. The general definition of "person" in the
Penal Code is as follows: "'Person' means a human being, and where appropriate, a public or
private corporation." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(7) (McKinney 1975).
120. 77 Misc.2d at 787, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 811.
121. This trend has also reached the United States Congress. Section I of Title I of the
United States Code provides that in determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, "the
words 'person' and 'whoever' include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships,
societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals." I U.S.C. § I (1982).
122. No. 5324 (Ind. Sup. Ct., indictment filed Sept. 13, 1978), digested at 47 U.S.L.W.
2178 (1978).
123. Id. This case has been noted for making two additional advances in corporate crim-
inal liability. The corporation was indicted for reckless homicide rather than the lesser offense
of negligent homicide. It was also the first time a corporation was indicted for a criminal
offense in a products liability matter. See Corporate Behavior, supra note 39, at 1281.
124. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-1-2 (Burns 1979) defines "person" to include "a human
being, corporation, partnership, unincorporated association, or government entity." The court's
conclusion was further supported by another section of the criminal title which stated that
corporations are subject to prosecution for any offense. Id. at § 35-41-2-3(a).
125. The Ford Motor Co. case raised a great deal of controversy and spurred several
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Since Ford Motor Co., courts in Pennsylvania,'126 Kentucky 127
and California' 2 8 have addressed the issue of corporate criminal lia-
bility for homicide and sustained prosecutions against the corpora-
tions involved. When faced with a similar question in Texas, how-
ever, the appellate court rejected the concept of corporate criminal
liability for homicide, thereby becoming the only state in recent
years to do so.
In Vaugh & Sons, Inc. v. State,129 the corporation allegedly
caused the death of two individuals in a motor vehicle collision.130
The court acknowledged the fact that the Texas Penal Code includes
a corporation within the definition of person"3' and accepted the con-
cept that a corporation may be held criminally liable for the criminal
acts of its agents.'3 2 The court, however, refused to extend this con-
comments by legal scholars. See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 259-62
(1980). See, e.g., Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: The Controversy
Flames Anew, 17 CAL. W.L. REV. 465, 483-84 (1981) (discussing the Ford Motor Co. case
and its impact on corporate criminal deterrence); Note, Corporate Homicide: A New Assault
on Corporate Decision-making, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW 911, 919-24 (1979) (analyzing the
Ford Motor Co. case and its impact on the evolution of corporate criminal liability). Much
analysis has focused on the propriety of criminal sanctions in the corporate homicide context.
One group maintains that the Ford Motor Co. case put the corporate world on notice that it
can be indicted for homicide. See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra; Comment, supra. The
other group argues that the case demonstrates how easily large corporations can escape crimi-
nal liability even when they clearly deserve punishment. See M. ERMANN & R. LUNDMAN,
CORPORATE DEVIANCE 17-18 (1982); Corporate Behavior, supra note 39, at 1281-82.
126. In Commonwealth v, Mcllwain School Bus Lines, Inc., 283 Pa. Super. I, 423 A.2d
413 (1980), the corporation was charged with homicide by vehicle. The Pennsylvania Vehicle
Code provided that homicide by vehicle may be committed by "[any person who unintention-
ally causes the death of another person. ... 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3732 (Purdon
1977). The Vehicle Code defined "person" as "[a] natural person, firm, co-partnership, associ-
ation or corporation." 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102 (Purdon 1977). The court concluded
that homicide by vehicle may be committed by a corporation. 283 Pa. Super. at 15, 423 A.2d
at 420.
127. In Commonwealth v. Fortner LP Gas, 610 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), the
court of appeals sustained an indictment against a corporation for manslaughter in the second
degree. The Kentucky Penal Code defined "person" as follows: "'Person' means human being,
and where appropriate, a public or private corporation or unincorporated association, a part-
nership, a government or a governmental authority." KY. REV. STAT. § 500.080(12) (1975).
128. Granite Construction Co. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 197 Cal. Rptr.
3 (1983). The corporation was charged with the death of seven construction workers who were
killed in an accident at a power plant. The Court of Appeals, Fifth District, denied the corpo-
ration's petition for a preemptory writ of mandate challenging its indictment. The California
Penal Code defines "person" so as to include corporations. CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West 1970).
The Penal Code also has a catch-all statute that provides for punishment of corporations. Id.
at § 672. The court concluded that for purposes of liability for criminal prosecution a corpora-
tion "stands before the law on the same footing as individuals." 149 Cal. App. 3d at 467, 197
Cal. Rptr. at 5.
129. 649 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 1983, pet. granted).
130. Id. At trial the corporation was convicted and assessed a fine of $5,000.00.
131. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(27) (Vernon 1974). "Person" is defined as "an
individual, corporation, or association." Id.
132. 649 S.W.2d at 678.
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cept of vicarious corporate liability to crimes requiring specific
intent.'33
For crimes requiring specific intent, the court stated that it was
necessary to examine the legislative intent for each specific crime to
determine whether corporations were included within the class of
culpable parties. 34 For the offense of criminally negligent homicide,
the court reasoned that "whoever is capable of committing criminal
homicide must also be capable of intent, knowledge, and recklessness
- not just criminal negligence."' 35 The court concluded that a cor-
poration was incapable of such intent and knowledge and, therefore,
reversed the conviction of the trial court.' 6
D. Causation
In addition to overcoming the various barriers that have tradi-
tionally precluded the extension of criminal liability to the corporate
criminal, 37 the prosecution must satisfy all the necessary common
law elements of homicide in order to obtain a conviction against the
corporation. At common law, an individual was guilty of murder if
the prosecution could prove that the defendant committed an affirm-
ative act, or failed to act when there was a duty to act, that the
defendant had a malicious state of mind, and that his conduct was
the "legal" cause of the death of a human being. Additionally, in
many jurisdictions, death must occur within a year and a day after
the defendant's act or omission to act. 38
Of the four elements necessary to prove murder, the proof of
causation can be very difficult. Proof of a culpable state of mind is
necessary to the imposition of criminal liability. It is not enough,
however, that the defendant conducts himself with an intention to
produce the specified result; the defendant's act or omission must
have also caused the prohibited result. 139 For those crimes which re-
quire that the defendant intentionally, recklessly or negligently cause
a certain result, proof of causation remains a necessary element of
133. Id. The court remarked that "it is fundamental to our criminal jurisprudence that
for more serious offenses guilt is personal and not vicarious." Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 678-79. The Texas Penal Code states that "[a] person commits criminal
homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence causes the
death of an individual." TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.01 (Vernon 1974).
136. 649 S.W.2d at 679.
137. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
138. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 20, § 7.1(f) at 611.
139. See Note, Criminal Liability of Corporate Managers for Deaths of their Employ-
ees: People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 46 ALB. L. REv. 655, 663 (1982) [hereinafter Liability of
Corporate Managers]. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 20, § 3.12, at 277.
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liability. 1 0
To prove causation it is necessary to show that the conduct of
the defendant was both the actual cause and the "legal" cause of the
result.141 Conduct is considered the actual cause of a particular re-
sult if the result would not have happened in the absence of such
conduct. 4" This requirement is commonly referred to as the "but
for" test.14
The second hurdle in proving causation is often the most diffi-
cult. Even if the defendant's conduct is the actual cause of the par-
ticular result, liability will not be imposed if it is not the "legal"
cause of the result.1 4 "[P]roblems of legal causation arise when the
actual result of the defendant's conduct varies from the result which
the defendant intended (in the case of crimes of intention) or from
the result which his conduct created a risk of happening (in the case
of crimes of recklessness and negligence). 1 4 Typical variances be-
tween intended results and actual results may be in the person or
property harmed, the manner in which the harm occurs, or the type
or degree of the harm. '
6
Most of the actual cases addressing the question of "legal" cau-
sation concern homicide." 7 In People v. Warner-Lambert Co.,' 48 the
Court of Appeals of New York addressed the question of "legal"
cause in the context of corporate criminal responsibility. 49 The de-
fendant corporation'"0 and several of its officers and employees were
charged with six counts of manslaughter in the second degree' 51 and
140. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 20 § 3.12 at 277.
141. Id. at 281.
142. Id. at 282.
143. Id. at 279. The authors stated that the test may be articulated as "'but for' the
antecedent conduct the result would not have occurred." Id. Model Penal Code § 2.03(1)
states that conduct "is the cause of a result when . . . it is an antecedent but for which the
result in question would not have occurred." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(1) (1962).
144. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 20, § 3.12 at 279.
145. Id. at 286-87.
146. Id. at 287. A key element of legal cause is foreseeability. In this context, "'foresee-
able' means something less than probable or likely but more than possible; perhaps it is best
described as something which, as one looks back on the event, does not strike him as extraordi-
nary." Id. § 7.12 at 284. A defendant will not be liable for manslaughter if the manner in
which the victim is killed seems quite extraordinary in light of what could be foreseen or was
foreseeable. Id.
147. Id.
148. 51 N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1031 (1981).
149. Id.
150. Warner-Lambert Co. is a manufacturing corporation. The plant involved in this
suit was in the production of Freshen-Up chewing gum.
151. The New York Penal Code defines "manslaughter in the second degree" as follows:
"A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when: He recklessly causes the death
of another person." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 1975).
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six counts of criminally negligent homicide' 52 as a result of the
deaths of six employees. The deaths were the result of a massive
explosion and fire in the corporation's manufacturing plant caused
by the improper ventilation of flammable particles and gases. 8'
Addressing the question of the defendant's criminal liability, the
court recognized that corporations may be indicted for homicide. 154
As to causation, the court stated that the evidence was "sufficient to
establish the existence of a broad, undifferentiated risk of explosion
from ambient MS (magnesium stearate) dust which had been
brought to the attention of defendants. It may be assumed that, if it
be so categorized, the risk was both substantial and unjustifiable."',55
The court, however, concluded that something more was necessary to
prove causation. Expanding upon the common law definition of cau-
sation, the court held that "the defendants actions must be a suffi-
ciently direct cause of the ensuing death before there can be any
imposition of criminal liability."15 For causation to be established
under this rule, each particular event in the chain of events leading
up to the ultimate result must have been foreseen or foreseeable. 57
Dismissing the indictment, the court held that the evidence failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants should have
foreseen the physical cause of the explosion.118
152. The New York Penal Code defines "criminally negligent homicide" as follows: "A
person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes the
death of another person." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney 1975).
153. 51 N.Y.2d at 299, 414 N.E.2d at 661, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 160. On the day of the
explosion the employees were working with magnesium stearate (MS), a dry, dust-like lubri-
cant and liquid nitrogen. Both chemicals are normally considered safe and are commonly used
in the manufacturing process. The process employed by Warner-Lambert to apply the MS
resulted in the release of a high concentration of MS dust into the air. Id. at 299, 414 N.E.2d
at 662, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 161. When suspended in the air in sufficient concentration, the dust
poses a substantial risk of explosion if ignited. Aware of the substantial degree of risk involved,
the corporation had begun to modify its production process. On the date of the accident, how-
ever, only one of six production units had been modified. Id. at 301, 414 N.E.2d at 663, 434
N.Y.S.2d at 162.
154. Id. at 303 n.1, 414 N.E.S.2d at 664 n.I, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 163 n.I. The court pre-
sumed, without actually deciding, that sections 125.10 and 125.15 of the New York Penal
Code were sufficient in scope to encompass deaths occurring in the course of manufacturing
operations. The court stated, however, that no case had actually addressed the issue and that
legislative history did not mandate such a result. The court then cited authority both for and
against application of the Penal Code in this context. Id.
155. Id. at 304, 414 N.E.2d at 664, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 163. Counsel for the People argued
that this observation was sufficient to satisfy a "but-for" test of causation. The People argued
that "there was evidence of a foreseeable and indeed foreseen risk of explosion of MS dust and
that in consequence of defendant's failure to remove the dust a fatal explosion occurred." Id.
at 305-06, 414 N.E.2d at 665, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 164.
156. Id. at 306, 414 N.E.2d at 666, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 165 (emphasis in original).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 305, 414 N.E.2d at 665, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 164.
92 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1987
The Warner-Lambert decision has been criticized" 9 for its in-
terpretation of the elements of causation. Prior to the decision, New
York's highest court, in People v. Kibbe,' 60 stated that to impose
criminal liability upon an individual it was sufficient to prove that
"the ultimate harm is something which should have been foreseen as
being reasonably related to the acts of the accused."'' The court's
recognition of a "broad, undifferentiated risk of an explosion"' 2
seems to satisfy the Kibbe court's "harm ...which should have
been foreseen" standard.'"3 The Warner-Lambert court, however, ex-
panded upon the Kibbe rule of foreseeability, adding to it the re-
quirement that the defendant foresee the exact chain of events lead-
ing to the ultimate result.'4 Thus, the Warner-Lambert court
"shifted the causation focus from a zone of harm to a pin-pointed
cause of harm."' 65 This new standard is inconsistent with the com-
mon law rules of causation."
III. People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc.
A. The Decision
In People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc., a1 the corporation'68
and its sister company, Metallic Marketing Systems, Inc., 69 were
159. See, e.g., Corporations Can Kill Too, supra note 1, at 1438-39 (The Warner-Lam-
bert standard "is inconsistent with the prior rule of causation"); Liability of Corporate Man-
agers, supra note 139, at 659 (Warner-Lambert "may practically preclude the application of
the New York homicide statutes to corporate agents.").
160. 35 N.Y.2d 407, 321 N.E.2d 773, 362 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1974), affd sub nom. Hen-
derson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977).
161. Id. at 412, 321 N.E.2d at 776, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 851-52.
162. 51 N.Y.2d at 304, 414 N.E.2d at 664, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 163.
163. 35 N.Y.2d at 412, 321 N.E.2d at 776, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 851-52.
164. 51 N.Y.2d at 305, 414 N.E.2d at 665, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 164. See also Liability of
Corporate Manager, supra note 139, at 672 (The author notes that the Kibbe court "left
unclear whether 'ultimate harm' meant simply the occurrence of death or the particular way
that death occurred. The Warner-Lambert court held that 'ultimate harm' means the particu-
lar way that death occurs.").
165. See Radin, supra note 10, at 14.
166. See supra notes 137-46 and accompanying text.
167. Nos. 83-11091, 84-5064 (Cook County Cir. Ct. of III. June 14, 1985).
168. Film Recovery Systems, Inc. (FRS) is a small corporation located in suburban Elk
Grove Village, Illinois. Using a standard process called cyanide-leaching, the firm recovers
silver from old photographic film. The process required employees to dip film chips into large
vats containing sodium cyanide and water. When the film came in contact with the solution it
reacted producing silver cyanide. The silver cyanide was then placed in electroplating tanks.
An electric current drew the silver onto metal plates. From these plates employees could re-
move scrapes of silver. FRS then shipped the silver scrapes to a refinery where the scrapes are
processed into silver bullion. The process can be highly profitable and in FRS's case grossed
between $13 and $20 million per year. Corporations Can Kill Too, supra note 1, at 1425.
169. Between 1979 and 1983 FRS had substantially expanded its production capacities.
Its work force increased from six to forty employees; the majority of employees being illegal
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charged with involuntary manslaughter 17° and fourteen counts of
reckless conduct 17 ' as a result of the death of Stefan Golab, 7 1 a
company employee. 77 Golab died from inhaling cyanide gases174
that had permeated throughout the firm's factory. The individual de-
fendants, Steven O'Neil,'75 Charles Kirschbaum 76 and Daniel Rod-
riguez 77 were charged with murder 178 and fourteen counts of reck-
less conduct.
7 9
Based on a total review of all the evidence presented, Judge
aliens who spoke little or no English. Id. See, e.g., Moberg, Employers who create hazardous
workplaces could face more than just regulatory fines. They could be charged with murder.,
14 STUDENT LAWYER 36 (Feb. 1986) ("[A] former bookkeeper testified that illegal aliens
from Poland and Mexico were deliberately chosen to work with the dangerous chemicals since
they were less likely to be knowledgeable or to complain.").
170. Illinois has no separate degrees of murder. Homicide is either murder, voluntary
manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter or reckless homicide. Illinois defines involuntary man-
slaughter as follows: "A person who intentionally kills an individual without lawful justifica-
tion commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the
death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he
performs them recklessly. ... ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-3 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
171. Illinois defines reckless conduct as follows:
A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a sub-
stantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will fol-
low, described by the statute defining the offense; and such disregard constitutes
a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would
exercise in the situation ....
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 4-6 (Smith-Hurd 1984).
172. Stefan Golab was a 61-year-old Polish immigrant with a work visa. Golab began
working at the large vats pumping and stirring the sodium cyanide solution inside the vats.
The containers of sodium cyanide solution carried warning labels that read, in English:
"Poison. Danger! May be fatal if inhaled, swallowed or absorbed through skin. Contact with
acid or weak alkalies liberates poisonous gas . . . .Do not breathe dust or gas. Do not get in
eyes, on skin, on clothing." Corporations Can Kill Too, supra note 1, at 1426. The workers at
FRS dissolved the sodium cyanide in water, a weak alkali. Id. Despite attempts with the aid of
an interpreter Golab was unable to effect a transfer. On February 10, 1983 Gobal collapsed
and died on the job. Id. at 1427.
173. Report of Proceedings at 4, People v. Film Recovery Systems, inc.
174. Medical and toxicological reports revealed that Golab had a blood cyanide level of
3.45 micrograms per millitre, a lethal dose. Id. at 6.
175. FRS was founded in 1979 by Steven J. O'Neil. With the aid of B.R. MacKay &
Sons, Inc. of Salt Lake City, O'Neil established the sister company Metallic Marketing Sys-
tems, Inc. See Corporations Can Kill Too, supra note 1, at 1425.
176. The plant manager, Charles Kirschbaum, accepted his position at FRS after two
years experience at another silver reclamation company. Kirschbaum's former employer, who
also used the cyanide-leaching process, controlled the potentially poisonous gas by installing
hooded vents over each vat. Id. at 1426. FRS chose not to use such effective methods to re-
move the gas, but rather, they relied on a faulty ceiling exhaust system and safety equipment
that failed to prevent any of the potential harm. Id.
177. Daniel Rodriguez acted as foreman and assistant manager at the FRS plant.
178. Illinois defines murder as follows:
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits
murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death:
(2) He knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to that individual or another . . ..
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
179. Report of Proceedings at 3-4, People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc.
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Banks delivered a guilty verdict as to all counts,"' ° stating that the
individual "defendants were totally knowledgeable in the dangers
which are associated with the use of cyanide." ' He found that the
failure to properly warn employees of the dangers of working with
cyanide was "reckless conduct"'82 and, through their acts of com-
mission and omission, the defendants had created the lethal environ-
ment at the plant."8"
In addressing the issue of corporate criminal liability,"8 Judge
Banks rejected the notion that a corporation cannot be convicted of a
crime requiring specific intent. 88 Specifically, Judge Banks stated
that
[T]he mind and mental state of a corporation is the mind and
mental state of the directors, officers and high managerial per-
sonnel because they act on behalf of the corporation for both the
benefit of the corporation and for themselves; and if the corpora-
tion's officers, directors and high managerial personnel act
within the scope of their corporate responsibilities and employ-
ment for their benefit and for the benefit of the profits of the
corporation, the corporation must be held liable for what oc-
180. Id. at II. Judge Banks' opinion contained only findings of fact. It did not include
legal theory or citation to precedent.
181. Id. at 7-8.
182. Id. at 9.
183. Id. Judge Banks stated that "The death of Stefan Golab was not accidental, but in
fact murder." Id.
184. To overcome traditional statutory barriers to criminal prosecution of corporations,
the prosecution relied on section 5-4 of the Illinois Criminal Code. Section 5-4 allowed indict-
ment of a corporation pursuant to a demonstration of legislative intent to impose such liability.
Section 5-4 provides:
(a) A corporation may be prosecuted for the commission of an offense if,
but only if:
(I) The offense is . . . defined by another statute which clearly indi-
cates a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation, and an
agent of the corporation performs the conduct which is an element of the
offense while acting within the scope of his office or employment and in
behalf of the corporation .. ; or
(2) The commission of the offense is authorized, requested, com-
manded, or performed, by the board of directors or by a high managerial
agent who is acting within the scope of his employment in behalf of the
corporation . ...
(c) For the purpose of this Section:
(I) "Agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee, or other
person who is authorized to act in behalf of the corporation.
(2) "High managerial agent" means any officer of the corporation,
or any other agent who had a position of comparable authority for the
formulation of corporate policy or the supervision of subordinate employ-
ees in a managerial capacity.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 5-4 (Smith-Hurd 1985).
185. Report of Proceedings at 9, People v. Film Recovery System, Inc.
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curred in the work place.' 8"
On July 1, 1985, the three individual defendants were sentenced
to 25 years in the Illinois state prison and fined $10,000 each.18 In
addition, Judge Banks imposed concurrent sentences of 364 days for
each of fourteen counts of reckless conduct.188 FRS and MMS were
fined a combined total of $48,000.189
B. Analysis
Writing in 1957, Professor Gerhard O.W. Mueller19 recognized
the strong necessity of holding corporations criminally liable for
their acts. He inquired, "Why should not a corporation be guilty of
murder where, for instance, a corporate resolution sends the corpora-
tion's workmen to a dangerous place of work without protection, all
officers secreting from these workmen the fact that even a brief
exposure to the particular work hazards will be fatal?" '91 Mueller
also recognized that a strong necessity does not justify imposition of
criminal liability when it is not appropriate. 92
In 1957 the rationale justifying the trend toward increased cor-
porate accountability was still undergoing substantial changes. Bar-
riers to expansion of corporate criminal liability still prevented a suc-
cessful prosecution of a corporate defendant. The evolution of the
doctrine has gradually eroded each barrier to the extension of liabil-
ity. People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc. is a breakthrough repre-
senting the culmination of the evolution of corporate criminal
responsibility.
The novelty of the Film Recovery decision is not the fact that
the corporation was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Several
courts had already found corporations guilty of manslaughter. 193 The
significance of the Film Recovery decision is that in addition to the
186. Id. at 9-10. It is important to note here that Judge Banks has adopted the "quali-
fied approach" to corporate moral blameworthiness which advocates that the acts and intent of
only top level personnel should be imputed to the corporation. See supra notes 87-90 and
accompanying text.
187. Film Recovery Executives Sentences to 25 Years for 1983 Employee Death, [June-
Nov.] O.S.H. REP. (BNA) No. 1-26, at 76 (July 4, 1985).
188. Id. There is no parole in Illinois. The maximum time off the sentence allowed for
good behavior is one day for each day served. Thus, O'Neil, Kirschbaum and Rodriguez must
serve at least 12 / years of their 25 year sentence. Id.
189. See Corporations Can Kill Too, supra note 1, at 1433.
190. Gerhard O.W. Mueller was an associate professor of law at West Virginia
University.
191. See Mueller, supra note 55, at 23.
192. Id.
193. See supra notes 109-14, 126-28 and accompanying text.
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conviction of FRS and MMS, the court also found three individual
officers of the corporation guilty of murder. The case represents the
first time in the history of the United States that the corporation and
its officers were convicted of homicide.19 While the decision is
unique in that it is a logical progression in the evolution of corporate
criminal responsibility, the real breakthrough will be felt in the pol-
icy ramifications of the decision. Film Recovery is the first case to
satisfy the traditional common-law justification for the imposition of
criminal penalties.
The imposition of criminal penalties has traditionally been justi-
fied by one or more of four rationales: rehabilitation, incapacitation,
deterrence and retribution.195 These four rationales can be further
subcategorized into two primary goals of criminal punishment. In
theory, the imposition of criminal sanctions serves both social (deter-
rence) and moral (retribution) goals of a society.""
The rehabilitation and incapacitation of offenders and the deter-
rence of would-be offenders are socially desirable goals which may
be achieved through the imposition of criminal sanctions. 197 Retribu-
tion appeases the moral outrage of a society by ensuring that crimi-
nal offenders are given their just desserts." 8 "Imposing criminal
sanctions on a guilty person is justified, not because of the conse-
quences which will result, but because it is morally proper to punish
that person."' 99 A criminal sanction is most effective when it satisfies
both the social and moral goals of punishment. 00 In reality, how-
ever, it is very difficult to achieve an equal balance between deter-
rence and retribution.2 0
194. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
195. See Developments, supra note II, at 1231; H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMI-
NAL SANCTION 35-61 (1968); R. ORLOSKI, CRIMINAL LAW AN INDICTMENT 3 (1977); S.
RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 691 (1963); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (Pro-
posed Official Draft, 1962).
196. See, e.g., H. PACKER, supra note 195, at 36 ("[Tlhere are two and only two ulti-
mate purposes to be served by criminal punishment: the deserved infliction of suffering on
evildoers and the prevention of crime.").
197. See Developments, supra note II, at 1231.
198. See Developments. supra note II, at 1231-32; H. PACKER, supra note 195, at 37.
199. Developments, supra note II, at 1231 (emphasis added).
200. See. e.g., Developments, supra note II, at 1244 ("in designing standards of crimi-
nal liability for corporations and for individuals ..., the courts and legislatures must attempt
to strike an appropriate balance between deterrence and just desserts.").
201. See, e.g., Developments, supra note I1, at 1243 (in practice the two rationales
frequently conflict); H. PACKER, supra note 195, at 36 ("these two purposes are almost univer-
sally thought of as being incompatible."); J. WAITE, THE PREVENTION OF REPEATED CRIME 11
(1943) ("punishments designed for the one purpose [retribution] may not be well suited to the
other [deterrence]").
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Deterrence202 is cited by a majority of commentators as the pri-
mary justification for the imposition of sanctions upon corporate
criminals.2 0 3 The deterrent role of the criminal law is most effective
on the socially conscious and calculating criminal. Deterrence does
not threaten those persons whose status in society is in the lower
stratum.0° Those persons have nothing to risk, so the threat of a
criminal sanction is an ineffective deterrent. Deterrence also does not
affect the spontaneous, non-calculating criminal. °5
Corporations do not fit into either of these two categories. A
corporation is very conscious of its position in society and will not act
so as to jeopardize that status. Corporate activity is also very delib-
erate. Because corporations act to maximize their economic benefits,
all conduct is based on a cost-benefit analysis calculated to achieve
the desired result.2 6 Thus, "deterrence plays a more significant role
in the area of corporate crime than in other areas of the criminal
law."207
The common law has typically imposed the sanctions of impris-
onment and fines to deter socially undesirable conduct.10 8 The stigma
of criminality which is associated with these sanctions often serves as
an effective deterrent in and of itself.209 Whether these sanctions are
202. "Deterrence" has been defined as the "control or alteration of present and future
criminal behavior which is effected by fear of adverse extrinsic consequences resulting from
that behavior." D. BEYLEVELD, A BIBLIOGRAPHY ON GENERAL DETERRENCE RESEARCH xvi
(1978).
203. See Developments, supra note I!, at 1235 n.16; H. PACKER, supra note 195, at
356; Comment, Increasing Community Control Over Corporate Crime - A Problem in the
Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J. 280, 302 n.68 (1961); Corporate Behavior, supra note 39, at
1286; Radin, supra note 10, at 61.
204. See H. PACKER, supra note 195, at 45. See generally Andenaes, The General Pre-
ventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 957-60 (the author discusses how
criminal sanctions have a varying degree of deterrent effect depending on the social and eco-
nomic status of the individual).
205. See Developments, supra note I1, at 1235. See, e.g., S. RUHIN, supra note 195, at
658 ("where strong passions or deep psychological motives are involved, the prospect of detec-
tion and punishment has relatively little effect" in deterring potential offenders). See also
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Discussing the deterrent effect of the death penalty
for the crime of murder the Court stated that "there are murderers, such as those who act in
passion, for whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent effect." Nevertheless, the Court
reasoned that for certain calculated crimes "the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant
deterrent." Id. at 185.
206. See Developments, supra note II, at 1235-36 & n.20; Mueller, supra note 55, at
42.
207. See Developments, supra note II, at 1236.
208. Id. at 1365.
209. See Developments, supra note 11, at 1367. See, e.g., Kadish, Some Observations
On the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV.
423, 437 (1963) ("The central distinguishing aspect of the criminal sanction appears to be the
stigmatization of the morally culpable."); Kennedy, A Critical Appraisal of Criminal Deter-
rence Theory, 88 DICK. L. REV. I, 7 (1983) ("The social stigma attached to a conviction is
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effective deterrents to corporate criminal behavior is uncertain.1
Most commentators do agree, however, that if stringent sanctions
are vigorously enforced, they can effectively deter corporate crime.2"
The threat of criminal sanctions is especially effective as a deterrent
when the sanctions are applied to both the corporation and its indi-
vidual officers. 12
Several commentators question the effectiveness of criminal
sanctions as deterrents .21  They argue that corporate criminal sanc-
tions are an effective deterrent whether applied to the corporation or
the individual. 1 The corporate entity may not be imprisoned, so the
primary sanction against illicit behavior is the imposition of a fine.
As presently administered, however, the small fixed fines imposed on
corporations are treated merely as a cost of doing business. 5
The imposition of very large, substantial fines may force the
corporation to double-check its cost-benefit analysis and thereby ef-
fectively deter the corporation from further illicit conduct. It is fre-
quently argued, however, that such large penalties will be felt most
heavily by innocent parties associated with the corporation.2 10 The
less culpable parties, including shareholders, creditors and consumers
will be the ones who feel the brunt of any sanction imposed on the
corporation. 7 This argument is most often made on behalf of the
shareholders who have not participated in any criminal conduct but
part of the punishment and, in some instances, may have a greater deterrent effect than the
term of imprisonment itself."); J. WAITE, supra note 201, at 15 (One argument supporting the
notion that punishment can be an effective deterrent rests "not upon fear of physical suffering
so much as upon unwillingness to incur the reprobation and contumely of one's fellow human
beings.").
210. See Developments, supra note II, at 1244 n.5.
211. See id. at 1244; Kennedy, supra note 209, at 4; H. PACKER, supra note 195, at 39-
45, 356-57.
212. See infra notes 233-38 and accompanying text.
213. See Developments, supra note II, at 1366; Comment, Increasing Community Con-
trol Over Corporate Crimes - A Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J. 280, 293
(1961); Corporate Behavior, supra note 39, at 1286; Coffee, supra note 11, at 388-411; Radin,
supra note 10, at 49-59.
214. Developments, supra note II, at 1366.
215. Id. The author states that most corporations will risk the threat of criminal convic-
tion because the "possible profits so outweigh the possible penalties that widespread noncom-
pliance is inevitable" (quoting M. GREEN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 162 (1972)). The
Ford Motor Co. case is a perfect example of this theory. Ford Motor Co. chose not to make
improvements on their Pintos that would have prevented explosion in rear-end collisions. In-
stead the company marketed a less costly yet extremely dangerous model. For a discussion of
the Ford Motor Co. case and its ramifications, see supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
216. See Radin, supra note 10, at 53.
217. Id. See, e.g., Corporate Behavior, supra note 39, at 1292 ("The opponents of cor-
porate criminal liability have urged that the fine falls upon the stockholders, who are twice
removed from the wrongdoer."); Corporations Can Kill Too, supra note 1, at 1436 (liability of
a corporation is likely to have a "negative effect on consumers").
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whose securities may be devalued when the penalty is levied upon
the corporation. 18
It still might be argued that criminal sanctions are an effective
deterrent when applied to the individual members of the corpora-
tion.219 The threat of imprisonment may be the most effective way to
prevent employee violations of the law. Even the incentive of in-
creased profits will vanish in the face of a threatened jail sentence.
The stigma associated with such sanctions is in itself a powerful de-
terrent, even absent a conviction.220 In practice, however, the threat
of personal conviction upon the individual officers and officials of the
corporation has not been a reality.
221
Several factors have traditionally worked to ensure that the in-
dividual actors go unpunished. The problems of moral neutrality, the
proclivity of juries to acquit corporate officials and the difficulties of
prosecution have consistently prevented successful prosecution of
corporate personnel.
First, the problem of moral neutrality has played a substantial
role in the field of corporate criminal liability. 22 For years society
has been unwilling to label illicit corporate behavior as worthy of
moral condemnation. 2  Legislatures frequently characterize corpo-
rate criminal violations as social offenses, not worthy of condemna-
tion. 224 Public welfare offenses,225 for example, punish illicit behavior
regardless of culpability.226 Thus, the focus of the community has
been directed away from behavior that is morally offensive and de-
serving of criminal punishment.
Second, the trend of juries has been to acquit the white-collar
individuals while convicting the firm.2  Typically, the officers and
officials of corporations are also the civic leaders of the community.
They have wide public support which is manifested in an unwilling-
ness of the jury to impose the criminal label and stigma upon some-
one who committed a violation that has traditionally been considered
218. See Radin, supra note 10, at 53. The author recognizes that this argument fails to
consider that the shareholder's loss is limited to his initial investment and may be recognized
as the risk of entering the market.
219. See Developments, supra note II, at 1367; Corporate Behavior, supra note 39, at
1289.
220. See supra note 209.
221. See Developments, supra note II, at 1367.
222. See Kadish, supra note 209, at 435-40.
223. See id. at 437; Radin, supra note 10, at 50-52.
224. Radin, supra note 10, at 50.
225. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
226. Kadish, supra note 209, at 437.
227. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. See also Kadish, supra note 209, at
433; Developments, supra note II, at 1367; Corporate Behavior, supra note 39, at 1289.
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as not worthy of moral condemnation. 2 8
Last, the difficulties of prosecution are amplified by the ability
of corporations to protect culpable individuals.2 29 Determining which
individuals are responsible for the illicit conduct is especially difficult
in large corporations where the mechanisms of control and authority
are very complex. The unwillingness of society to label corporate
criminal conduct as morally reprehensible and the unwillingness of
juries to convict individual defendants of criminal violations, coupled
with the difficulty of pinpointing the culpable individual, lessen the
likelihood that the threat of personal conviction upon individual ac-
tors will provide an adequate deterrent.3
The arguments discussed above, which are traditionally prof-
fered by commentators suggesting that the deterrent threat is inade-
quate to prevent corporate misconduct, fail in light of the Film Re-
covery decision. Current judicial trends demonstrate a growing
willingness to impose criminal sanctions on corporate criminal of-
fenders. As society becomes increasingly aware of the egregious con-
duct of its corporations, it is no longer reluctant to deem such con-
duct as morally reprehensible.
The Film Recovery case and the wave of prosecutions that have
followed23 1 demonstrate society's changing attitudes toward corpo-
rate criminal responsibility. Prosecutors are more willing to prose-
cute corporate criminals knowing that the barriers to a successful
prosecution, which at one time made convictions highly unlikely, are
now broken down. 2 2 Furthermore, juries will be more willing to con-
vict corporate employees when faced with the knowledge that the
conduct of individual defendants has led to serious injury or death.
The importance of the current trend in corporate criminal liabil-
ity is the focus placed upon both the corporate entity and its individ-
228. See Kadish, supra note 209, at 437; Developments, supra note i1, at 1367. Even if
the jury convicts the individual defendants, the stigma associated with that conviction is often
negligible. See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 209, at 437 ("[W]here the violation is not generally
regarded as ethically reprehensible, either by the community at large or by the class of busi-
nessmen itself, the private appeal to conscience is at its minimum and being convicted and
fined may have little more impact than a bad selling season."); Corporate Behavior, supra
note 39, at 1289 ("Jurors often sympathize with an officer who acted for the good of the
corporation and view the officer as a victim of the profit-making pressures inherent in the
corporate world.").
229. See Developments, supra note 11, at 1368; Radin, supra note 10, at 57; MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.07, comment at 150 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
230. See Kennedy, supra note 209, at 8. As long as "any societal condition exists that
undermines the successful transmission or reception of the deterrent message," a criminal
sanction will not be an effective deterrent. Id.
231. See supra note 9.
232. See Middleton, supra note 9, at 8.
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ual officers. Several commentators have noted that for the deterrence
theory to be an adequate check on illicit corporate behavior both the
corporation and its individual decision-makers must be prosecuted."'
By directing the force of the law at both the corporate firm and its
directors, the deterrence threat will force the corporate entity and its
individual actors to monitor each other's activities. In effect, the
threat of prosecution will implement a sort of "checks and balances"
system on the corporation. The threat of prosecution will encourage
employees to seek out and remedy violations before they occur and it
will encourage the corporate entity to implement policies aimed at
preventing violations. Even in large corporations, the double threat
of prosecution will encourage the corporation to improve "internal
monitoring and discipline systems at senior levels."2 4
Commentators who criticize the deterrent threat of criminal
sanctions consistently base their theories in the context of prosecu-
tion of either the firm or the individuals. The generally accepted con-
clusion is that the firm could be successfully prosecuted but the sanc-
tions imposed are inadequate to support the prosecution.23 5 The
commentators also conclude that while the punishment of an individ-
ual could be a substantial threat, the likelihood of prosecution is so
minimal that the deterrent threat is inadequate to prevent criminal
violations .23  These arguments are no longer viable in light of the
Film Recovery decision and the trend that it represents.
"For a threat of punishment to be effective as a deterrent, the
threat must be credible and communicated. For credibility to be
achieved, the threatened target group must believe that the system is
capable of apprehending and punishing some offenders. 237 The cur-
rent judicial trend toward increased corporate criminal responsibility
has added certainty to a field of criminal prosecution that previously
lacked credibility. As the probability of conviction and punishment
increases, the viability of the deterrence threat is strengthened.23 8
233. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 11, at 387 ("[A] sensible approach to corporate misbe-
havior still must punish the firm as well as the individual decision-maker."); Radin, supra note
10, at 56 (directing enforcement of criminal violations at the corporation and its directors will
supplement the deterrent effect); Developments, supra note I1, at 1244 ("[Clorporate and
individual criminal liability are complementary, not mutually exclusive.").
234. See Radin, supra note 10, at 57.
235. See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 221-30 and accompanying text.
237. Kennedy, supra note 209, at 5.
238. See id. at 4-5. See, e.g., G. Dix & M. SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW 122 n.l (1979)
("The personality's ability to restrain instinctual urges to engage in aggressive and antisocial
behavior will remain effective only if it is periodically reinforced by punishment of those who
engage in such behavior.").
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Prosecution and conviction of both the corporation and its individual
officers is now a reality. The deterrence effect, therefore, is also a
reality.
IV. Conclusion
For years, the imposition of criminal sanctions to punish corpo-
rate criminal activities has been criticized for its failure to effectively
punish convicted corporations and for its failure to deter would-be
corporate offenders. Historically, the doctrine of corporate criminal
liability has been burdened by legal barriers that prevented efficient
prosecution of corporations. As society recognized the need to con-
trol corporate crime, courts overcame these barriers. The current ju-
dicial trend in corporate criminal liability is the punishment of both
the corporation and its individual officers. This trend, like other de-
velopments in the past, has developed to increase the efficiency of
corporate prosecution. By prosecuting the corporation and its of-
ficers, this dual-system of punishment takes a step closer to striking
a balance between the two primary goals of criminal punishment:
retribution and deterrence.
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